Hearth Record

Encompass Health Rehabilitation Hospital of Panama

An inpatient rehabilitation facility in Panama City, Florida 32405

1847 Florida Ave, Panama City, Florida 32405. (850) 914-8600.

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The short answer

Record last released by CMS on Oct 20, 2026.

The last 24 months 4 deficiencies in 1 month of the last 36. Last cited Feb 2025. Most serious: Condition-level. Every month

Each figure’s source sits beside it, in its section below.

What these words mean3
Inspection (survey)
A visit by state inspectors, often unannounced, who check a place against the rules it must meet. For nursing homes and other places Medicare pays, CMS calls these visits surveys: a standard survey of a nursing home comes at least every 15 months, and a complaint survey whenever a complaint calls for one. Source: CMS; 42 CFR 488.308.
Deficiency, citation, violation
What inspectors write up when a place didn’t meet a rule: the rule, what they saw, and when. CMS calls it a deficiency; states may say citation or violation. It is the inspectors’ finding, not a court’s, and the place is usually asked for a plan to correct it. Source: CMS, statement of deficiencies (Form CMS-2567); each state’s licensing agency.
Condition-level deficiency
For hospices, home health agencies, hospitals and dialysis facilities, CMS writes deficiencies at two levels. Standard is the usual one; condition-level is the more serious, when a problem is serious enough that the provider doesn’t meet a whole condition of taking part in Medicare. Source: CMS, State Operations Manual.

What did inspectors find?

The last inspection on record was on Feb 21, 2025: a complaint inspection.

4 deficiencies cited in the last three years, 2 of them at condition level, the most serious.

2 deficiencies at condition level, the more serious of CMS’s two levels

Source:

CMS, QCOR Hospital 2567 statements of deficiencies. Released Oct 20, 2026. Updated monthly.

When those deficiencies happened

4 deficiencies in 1 month of the last 36. Last cited Feb 2025. Most serious: Condition-level. The last 3 years, to Nov 5, 2026.

4 deficiencies by month over the last 3 years. Each cell is one month.
JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDec
2023 Dec
2024 JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDec
2025 JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDec
2026 JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNov

Hover or focus a month to read it.

No visit on record Visited, nothing cited A stronger orange is more serious, on its source’s own levels, read onto four bands: from the least serious it publishes to the most
Source:

Hearth Record drew this from the dates and levels in the source’s own records.

Each deficiency, as cited

Rule titles as CMS’s inspectors cite them, set in sentence case.

Source:

CMS, QCOR Hospital 2567 statements of deficiencies. Released Oct 20, 2026. Updated monthly.

Feb 21, 2025: complaint inspection4 deficiencies
  • Patient Rights

    The inspectors’ words, 680 words

    “PATIENT RIGHTS CFR(s): 482.13 A hospital must protect and promote each patient’s rights. This Condition is not met as evidenced by: 45827 Based on observation, staff interview, interview with the offsite contracted cardiac monitoring company, record review and policy review, the hospital failed to protect and promote patient rights for safe and effective cardiac monitoring for 9 of 9 sampled patients (Deceased Patient #1, and 8 current patients receiving remote cardiac monitoring services #2, #4, #5, #6, #9, #10, #11, #13). Cardiac monitoring services were performed remotely via telemetry by a contracted company. The hospital had no onsite cardiac monitors, and hospital staff were dependent on notifications from the telemetry contractor regarding dysrhythmias (abnormal heart rhythms) and services being offline. On 1/21/2025, Patient #1 experienced a life threatening cardiac dysrhythmia requiring cardiopulmonary resuscitation. The contracted telemetry monitoring company failed to notify the hospital of the change in cardiac rhythm during the event and later reported that the telemetry was offline at the time. Interviews with 5 of 9 hospital staff reported prior issues with telemetry going offline which was more prevalent in certain patient rooms (Staff B, C, E, the Chief Nursing Officer and the Quality and Risk Management Director). The hospital had 8 current patients with orders for remote telemetry monitoring. Cross Reference A0286. The cumulative effect of the failures resulted in a determination of Immediate Jeopardy at the Condition of Patient Rights. The hospital Chief Executive Officer and Quality and Risk Management Director were notified of Immediate Jeopardy on 02/21/2025 at 4:58 PM. Immediate Jeopardy began on 01/21/2025, the death date for Patient #1. The hospital submitted an acceptable Immediate Jeopardy removal plan and the state agency removed the Immediate Jeopardy on 02/21/2025 at 7:30 PM. The removal plan included the following immediate actions to remove the Immediate Jeopardy, and the on-site survey of 02/21/2025 found: 1. The hospital terminated the cardiac telemetry monitoring contract with the telemetry provider. Telemetry services will be deferred until further notice. Providers at Encompass Health and Rehabilitation Hospital of Panama City were notified that telemetry services have been discontinued indefinitely. The hospital will not admit any patients requiring telemetry services. On 02/21/2025, the survey team verified this via interview with the Quality and Risk Management Director. 2. The hospital immediately identified patients on telemetry and notified the medical team (physicians, advanced practice providers) of the urgent need for evaluation. After medical evaluation, seven patients’ telemetry services were discontinued and remained in the facility. One patient was transferred to the acute care hospital. On 02/21/2025, the survey team verified this via review of patient orders for the 8 current telemetry patients, verifying the patient transfer and via interview with the Quality and Risk Management Director. 3. The charge nurse or designated leader confirmed all telemetry discontinuation orders have been placed and carried out. Any patient requiring transfer will be tracked until safely admitted to the acute care hospital. Leadership was notified when the process was complete. On 02/21/2025, the survey team verified this via review of patient orders, interview with the Nurse Manager, and interview with the Quality and Risk Management Director. The findings include: Cross Reference A0144: Based on observation, staff interview, interview with the contracted cardiac monitoring company, clinical record review and policy review, the hospital failed to ensure patient rights of care in a safe setting for 9 of 9 sampled patients who had physician orders for continuous cardiac monitoring (Patient #1, deceased, and current patients #2, #4, #5, #6, #9, #10, #11, #13). On 1/21/2025, Patient #1 died after a cardiac event resulting in dysrhythmia and cardiopulmonary resuscitation. The contracted telemetry monitoring company failed to notify the hospital of the change in cardiac rhythm during the event and later reported that the telemetry was offline at the time. Interviews with 5 of 9 hospital staff reported issues with telemetry going offline, more prevalent in certain patient rooms, off and on for the past 2 years (Staff B, C, E, the Chief Nursing Officer and the Quality and Risk Management Director). The hospital had 8 current patients receiving telemetry monitoring.”

    Rule A0115. Condition-level. From a complaint.

  • Qapi

    The inspectors’ words, 788 words

    “QAPI CFR(s): 482.21 The hospital must develop, implement and maintain an effective, ongoing, hospital-wide, data-driven quality assessment and performance improvement program. The hospital’s governing body must ensure that the program reflects the complexity of the hospital’s organization and services; involves all hospital departments and services (including those services furnished under contract or arrangement); and focuses on indicators related to improved health outcomes and the prevention and reduction of medical errors. The hospital must maintain and demonstrate evidence of its QAPI program for review by CMS. This Condition is not met as evidenced by: 45827 Based on observation, staff interview, interview with the offsite contracted cardiac monitoring company, record review and policy review, the hospital failed to develop and implement a performance improvement plan to correct identified issues with remote cardiac monitoring services for 9 of 9 sampled patients (Deceased Patient #1, and 8 current patients receiving remote cardiac monitoring services #2, #4, #5, #6, #9, #10, #11, #13). Cardiac monitoring services were performed remotely via telemetry by a contracted company. The hospital had no onsite cardiac monitors, and hospital staff were dependent on notifications from the telemetry contractor regarding dysrhythmias (abnormal heart rhythms) and services being offline. On 1/21/2025, Patient #1 experienced a life threatening cardiac dysrhythmia requiring cardiopulmonary resuscitation. The contracted telemetry monitoring company failed to notify the hospital of the change in cardiac rhythm during the event and later reported that the telemetry was offline at the time. The hospital QAPI committee reviewed the death, but failed to develop immediate corrective actions regarding the contracted cardiac monitoring services. Interviews with 5 of 9 hospital staff reported prior issues with telemetry going offline which was more prevalent in certain patient rooms (Staff B Registered Nurse, Staff C Respiratory Therapist, Staff E Nurse Manager, the Chief Nursing Officer and the Quality and Risk Management Director). The hospital had 8 current patients with orders for remote telemetry monitoring. The cumulative effect of the failures resulted in a determination of Immediate Jeopardy at the Condition of Quality Assessment and Performance Improvement. The hospital Chief Executive Officer and Quality and Risk Management Director were notified of Immediate Jeopardy on 02/21/2025 at 4:58 PM. Immediate Jeopardy began on 01/21/2025, the death date for Patient #1. The hospital submitted an acceptable Immediate Jeopardy removal plan and the state agency removed the Immediate Jeopardy on 02/21/2025 at 7:30 PM. The removal plan included the following immediate actions to remove the Immediate Jeopardy, and the on-site survey of 02/21/2025 found: 1. A QAPI meeting was held on 02/21/2025 beginning at 1739. Members present included: Attending Provider (physician), Nurse Manager, Director of Quality and Risk, Chief Nursing Officer, and Chief Executive Officer. On 02/21/2025, the survey team verified this via review of the QAPI meeting minutes and interview with the Quality and Risk Management Director. 2. The hospital terminated the contract with the contracted telemetry provider. Telemetry services will be deferred until further notice. Providers at Encompass Health and Rehabilitation Hospital of Panama City were notified that telemetry services have been discontinued indefinitely. The hospital will not admit any patients requiring telemetry services. On 02/21/2025, the survey team verified this via interview with the Quality and Risk Management Director. 3. The hospital immediately identified patients on telemetry and notified the medical team (physicians, advanced practice providers) of the urgent need for evaluation. After medical evaluation, seven patients’ telemetry services were discontinued and remained in the facility. One patient was transferred to the acute care hospital. On 02/21/2025, the survey team verified this via review of patient orders, interview with the Nurse Manager, and interview with the Quality and Risk Management Director. The findings include: Cross Reference to A0286: Based on staff interview, interview with the contracted cardiac monitoring company, clinical record review, policy review, contract review, review of corrective actions following an adverse patient event, and observation, the hospital failed to implement preventative measures for 9 of 9 patients ordered to receive telemetry (remote cardiac monitoring) services (Patient #1 deceased, and 8 current patients #2, #4, #5, #6, #9, #10, #11, #13). The hospital contracted with a remote telemetry monitoring company located in another state. On 1/21/2025, Patient #1 died after a cardiac event resulting in dysrhythmia and cardiopulmonary resuscitation. The contracted telemetry monitoring company failed to notify the hospital of the change in cardiac rhythm during the event and later reported that the telemetry was offline at the time. Interviews with 5 of 9 hospital staff reported issues with telemetry going offline, more prevalent in certain patient rooms off and on for the past 2 years (Staff B, C, E, the Chief Nursing Officer and the Quality and Risk Management Director). The hospital QAPI program failed to address identified issues with the remote telemetry services.”

    Rule A0263. Condition-level. From a complaint.

  • Patient Rights: Care In Safe Setting

    The inspectors’ words, 1,625 words

    “PATIENT RIGHTS: CARE IN SAFE SETTING CFR(s): 482.13(c)(2) The patient has the right to receive care in a safe setting. This Standard is not met as evidenced by: 45827 Based on observation, staff interview, interview with the contracted cardiac monitoring company, record review and policy review, the hospital failed to ensure patient rights of care in a safe setting for 9 of 9 sampled patients who had physician orders for continuous cardiac monitoring (Patient #1 deceased, and current patients #2, #4, #5, #6, #9, #10, #11, #13). On 1/21/2025, Patient #1 died after a cardiac event resulting in dysrhythmia (abnormal heart rhythm) and cardiopulmonary resuscitation. The contracted telemetry monitoring company failed to notify the hospital of the change in cardiac rhythm during the event and later reported that the telemetry was offline at the time. Interviews with 5 of 9 hospital staff reported issues with telemetry going offline, more prevalent in certain patient rooms, off and on for the past 2 years (Staff B Registered Nurse, Staff C Respiratory Therapist, Staff E Nurse Manager, the Chief Nursing Officer and the Quality and Risk Management Director). The hospital had 8 current patients receiving telemetry monitoring. Cross Reference A0115. The findings include: Review of Patient #1’s medical record found Patient #1 was admitted on 01/08/2025 with diagnosis that included: Non-ST-Segment Elevation Myocardial Infarction (NSTEMI) (a type of heart attack where there is a partial blockage of a coronary artery, which reduces blood flow to the heart muscle); congestive heart failure (CHF) (a chronic condition where the heart muscle becomes weakened and cannot pump blood efficiently); cardiomyopathy (a group of diseases that affect the heart muscle, making it difficult for the heart to pump blood effectively); ejection fraction (a percentage of the total amount of blood in your heart that is pumped out with each heartbeat) of 10-15% (an ejection fraction below 40 percent means the heart is not pumping enough blood and may be failing). Remote Telemetry (Cardiac Monitoring transmitted to an offsite location) was ordered on 01/12/2025. On 1/21/25 at 4:32 PM, Registered Nurse B found Patient #1 on the bathroom floor without a pulse and immediately initiated a Code Blue (life threatening emergency requiring Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation [CPR]). The Code Blue/Rapid Response summary dated 01/21/25 for Patient #1 documented CPR was initiated at 4:35 PM, Patient #1 defibrillated via shock at 4:40 PM, CPR resumed, and EMS arrived at 4:41 PM. Upon stabilization of patient, Patient #1 was transported via EMS at 4:52 PM to an acute care hospital where he was pronounced deceased. Telemetry strips, dated as received by the hospital on 1/21/2025 at 7:07 PM (after the patient was transferred out), showed that ventricular fibrillation (a life-threatening arrhythmia requiring immediate CPR and electrical shocks) began at 4:30 PM Central time. A review of the hospital investigation revealed on 01/21/2025, Patient #1 was assisted to the bathroom and left unattended. The patient was found on the floor in distress, a Code Blue was initiated with immediate Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR). Emergency Medical Services (EMS) was notified, and Patient #1 was transferred to a hospital emergency department and died. The facility’s internal investigation revealed Patient #1 was in ventricular fibrillation. No phone call was received by the facility from the telemetry contractor to notify them Patient #1 was in ventricular fibrillation. On 02/19/2025 at approximately 2:46 PM, an interview was conducted with Staff B, a Registered Nurse (RN B) who stated that on 1/21/2025 at 4:30 PM, she walked into Patient #1’s bathroom and found the patient on the floor and non-responsive. RN B called for help and then pushed the Code Blue button. RN B then started CPR at 4:35 PM. Staff A, a Rehabilitation Nurse Technician, entered the bathroom and assisted with CPR and Staff C, a Respiratory Therapist, entered the room with the crash cart. She stated a staff at the nurses’ desk called EMS and the patient was taken to a local hospital. RN B stated she did not recall any communication from the telemetry contractor regarding Patient #1’s condition or problems with telemetry connectivity to [Wi-Fi] during the event. RN B stated she was aware of previous issues with the telemetry contractor not communicating either connectivity issues or changes in patients’ condition. She could not state when or how often this occurs as the facility does not document this. A tour of the hospital was conducted on 02/19/2025 beginning at approximately 10:15 AM. No cardiac telemetry display monitors were observed. The hospital staff were dependent on dysrhythmia and offline notifications from the telemetry contractor. On 02/19/2025 at approximately 10:30 AM, an interview was conducted with the Quality and Risk Management Director (QRMD). The QRMD stated they have problems with the telemetry contractor to include telemetry connectivity and communication regarding patients’ changes in conditions. She stated the facility is looking for another telemetry provider. The QMRD could not state how long they have had problems with the telemetry contractor as there were no call logs to document communication with telemetry contractor regarding issues. On 02/19/2025 at approximately 2:00 PM, an interview was conducted with the Chief Nursing Officer (CNO). The CNO stated the facility had connectivity and communication issues with the telemetry contractor. He stated there was no connectivity to telemetry monitors in some of the patient rooms requiring the patients to be moved to different rooms. He further stated the communication concern was related to the telemetry contractor’s responsiveness to changes in the patient’s condition. The CNO also stated there was also an issue with the quality of the telemetry strips. On 02/19/2025 at approximately 2:55 PM, an interview was conducted with Staff E, a Nurse Manager, who stated she was aware of issues with telemetry connectivity. Nurse Manager E further stated she verbally communicated the issue to leadership but could not remember when it was reported and did not have written communication of the report. Nurse Manager E stated when there were issues with telemetry connectivity, the patient was moved to a different room with better connectivity. On 02/20/2025 at approximately 9:55 AM, an interview was conducted with Staff C, Respiratory Therapist (RT C) who stated on 01/21/2025 he spoke with a telemetry contractor employee who could not provide any information on why the telemetry contractor did not report Patient #1 was in ventricular fibrillation or that there were connectivity issues with Patient #1’s telemetry monitor connectivity. RT C stated he was aware some patient rooms have more problematic connectivity issues than others and sometimes they have to move patients to another room for better connectivity. On 02/20/2025 at approximately 10:24 AM, an interview was conducted with the telemetry contractor Vice President of Operations (VPO). When asked for an explanation of the 01/21/2025 event with Patient #1, he stated, “Monitor offline.” He stated (name of the telemetry contractor) will send eight additional Wi-Fi boosters to the facility to improve telemetry connectivity. The VPO stated it was protocol for (name of the telemetry contractor) to communicate with the hospital when having problems with connectivity but he did not know why there was no communication regarding Patient #1. The VPO could not provide records of communication with the hospital because the event happened over a month ago and they do not keep records that long. On 02/20/2025 at approximately 10:54 AM, an additional interview was conducted with the QMRD who stated they do not have a system in place to improve patient cardiac monitoring until the new company was brought in. On 02/21/2025 at approximately 10:34 AM, an additional interview was conducted with the CNO who stated he has worked at the facility about 2 ½ years and during that time there have been issues with telemetry connectivity. The CNO further stated the facility does not track calls from the telemetry contractor or when they are notified of a telemetry monitor being offline and the telemetry contractor does not provide monitors for the facility to see patient telemetry in real time. He stated patient room #108 was a room that he knows has a dead spot. He has not instructed the supervisors not to admit patients to that room as they do not know if a patient will be ordered telemetry prior to being admitted. On 02/21/2025 at approximately 11:41 AM, an additional interview was conducted with the QMRD who stated Patient #1 left with EMS on 01/21/2025 with CPR in progress. The receiving facility notified the family that the patient had died, and the family later notified our Chief Executive Officer the patient had died. On 02/21/205 at approximately 1:00 PM, an additional interview was conducted with RT C who stated the facility has had connectivity issues with the telemetry contractor for at least a year. RT C further stated he receives frequent calls from the telemetry contractor about patients going offline, but no log of the calls is kept. He stated telemetry connectivity issues were more so in patient rooms around the central nurses’ station which were rooms 104, 105, 106, 107, and 108. The hospital provided a list of room locations for all patients receiving telemetry services for each day of the survey. On 02/19/2025, there were patients in both rooms 107 and 108 who were receiving telemetry services and there was a patient in room 107 receiving telemetry services on 02/20/2025 and 02/21/2025. A review of the Remote Telemetry Monitoring policy, revised on 04/09/2022, was conducted. On page 1 it states, “This program will allow patients to be monitored 24-hours a day for a period of time as defined by the physician.” On page 2, under Significant Cardiac Rhythm Disturbance, it states, “In the event of a significant cardiac rhythm disturbance, (name of the telemetry contractor) will call the supervisor phone to inform the staff of the change.” 50447”

    Rule A0144. Standard-level. From a complaint.

  • Patient Safety

    The inspectors’ words, 2,045 words

    “PATIENT SAFETY CFR(s): 482.21(a), (c)(2), (e)(3) (a) Standard: Program Scope (1) The program must include, but not be limited to, an ongoing program that shows measurable improvement in indicators for which there is evidence that it will ... identify and reduce medical errors. (2) The hospital must measure, analyze, and track ...adverse patient events ... (c) Program Activities ..... (2) Performance improvement activities must track medical errors and adverse patient events, analyze their causes, and implement preventive actions and mechanisms that include feedback and learning throughout the hospital. (e) Executive Responsibilities, The hospital’s governing body (or organized group or individual who assumes full legal authority and responsibility for operations of the hospital), medical staff, and administrative officials are responsible and accountable for ensuring the following: ... (3) That clear expectations for safety are established. This Standard is not met as evidenced by: 45827 Based on staff interview, interview with the contracted cardiac monitoring company, clinical record review, policy review, contract review, review of corrective actions following an adverse patient event, and observation, the hospital failed to implement preventative measures for 9 of 9 patients ordered to receive telemetry (remote cardiac monitoring) services (Patient #1 deceased, and 8 current patients #2, #4, #5, #6, #9, #10, #11, #13). The hospital contracted with a remote telemetry monitoring company located in another state. On 1/21/2025, Patient #1 died after a cardiac event resulting in dysrhythmia and cardiopulmonary resuscitation. The contracted telemetry monitoring company failed to notify the hospital of the change in cardiac rhythm during the event and later reported that the telemetry was offline at the time. Interviews with 5 of 9 hospital staff reported issues with telemetry going offline, more prevalent in certain patient rooms off and on for the past 2 years (Staff B Registered Nurse, Staff C Respiratory Therapist, Staff E Nurse Manager, the Chief Nursing Officer and the Quality and Risk Management Director). The hospital QAPI program failed to address identified issues with the remote telemetry services. Cross Reference A0115 and A0263. The findings include: A review of the hospital investigation following the death of Patient #1 on 01/21/2025 found that Patient #1 was assisted to the bathroom and left unattended. The patient was found on the floor in distress and a Code Blue (emergency response) was initiated with immediate Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR). Emergency Medical Services (EMS) was notified, and Patient #1 was transferred to a hospital emergency department where he was pronounced deceased. The hospital’s internal investigation revealed Patient #1 was in ventricular fibrillation (a life-threatening arrhythmia requiring immediate CPR and electrical shocks). No phone call was received by the hospital from the contracted telemetry monitoring company to notify them Patient #1 was in ventricular fibrillation. Telemetry strips, dated as received by the hospital on 1/21/2025 at 7:07 PM (after the patient was transferred out), showed that ventricular fibrillation (a life-threatening arrhythmia requiring immediate CPR and electrical shocks) began at 4:30 PM central time. The investigation included an analysis which stated the hospital was working with the contracted telemetry service provider regarding lack of notification of patients’ arrythmias and notification process failure may have caused a delay in care. The investigation also included the plan of correction for telemetry concerns, which stated the hospital was working with the contracted telemetry provider to obtain a copy of analysis and performance improvement plan/corrective action plan. No further corrective actions were indicated. A tour of the hospital was conducted on 02/19/2025 beginning at approximately 10:15 AM. No cardiac telemetry display monitors were observed within the hospital. On 02/19/2025 at approximately 10:30 AM, an interview was conducted with the Quality and Risk Management Director (QRMD). The QRMD stated they have problems with the contracted telemetry monitoring company to include telemetry connectivity [to Wi-Fi] and communication regarding patients’ changes in conditions. She stated the facility was looking for another telemetry provider. The QMRD could not state how long they have had problems with the contracted telemetry company as there were no call logs to document communication with the company regarding issues. On 02/19/2025 at approximately 2:00 PM, an interview was conducted with the Chief Nursing Officer (CNO). The CNO stated the hospital has connectivity and communication issues with the contracted telemetry company. He stated there were connectivity problems in some of the patient rooms requiring the patient to be moved to a different room. He further stated the communication concern was related to the contracted telemetry company’s responsiveness to changes in the patient’s condition. The CNO also stated there was also an issue with the quality of the telemetry strips. On 02/19/2025 at approximately 2:46 PM, an interview was conducted with Staff B, a Registered Nurse (RN B) who stated that on 1/21/2025 at 4:30 PM, she walked into Patient #1’s bathroom and found the patient on the floor and non-responsive. RN B called for help and then pushed the Code Blue button. RN B then started CPR at 4:35 PM. Staff A, a Rehabilitation Nurse Technician, entered the bathroom and assisted with CPR and Staff C, Respiratory Therapist, entered the room with the crash cart. RN B stated a staff at the nurses’ desk called EMS and the patient was taken to a local acute care hospital. RN B stated she did not recall any communication from the telemetry contractor notifying them of Patient #1’s condition or problems with telemetry connectivity during the event. RN B stated she was aware of previous issues with the telemetry contractor failing to communicate connectivity issues and/or changes in patients’ condition. RN B could not state when or how often this occurs as the hospital does not track this. On 02/19/2025 at approximately 2:55 PM, an interview was conducted with Staff E, a Nurse Manager, who stated she was aware of issues with telemetry connectivity. Nurse Manager E further stated she verbally communicated the issue to leadership but could not remember when it was reported and did not have written communication of the report. Nurse Manager E stated when there were issues with telemetry connectivity, the patient was moved to a different room with better connectivity. On 02/20/2025 at approximately 9:55 AM, an interview was conducted with Staff C, Respiratory Therapist (RT C) who reported on 01/21/2025 at 4:52 PM he spoke with a telemetry contractor employee who could not provide any information on why the telemetry contractor did not report Patient #1 was in ventricular fibrillation or that there were connectivity issues with Patient #1’s telemetry monitor connectivity. RT C stated he was aware some patient rooms have more problematic connectivity issues than others and sometimes they have to move patients to another room for better connectivity. On 02/20/2025 at approximately 10:24 AM, an interview was conducted with the Vice President of Operations (VPO) from the telemetry contractor. When asked for an explanation of the 01/21/2025 event with Patient #1, he stated, “Monitor offline.” He stated (name of telemetry contractor) will send eight additional Wi-Fi boosters to the facility to improve telemetry connectivity. The VPO stated it is protocol for (name of telemetry contractor) to communicate with the hospital when having problems with connectivity but he did not know why there was no communication regarding Patient #1. The VPO could not provide records of communication with the hospital because the event happened over a month ago and they do not keep records that long. On 02/20/2025 at approximately 1:45 PM, an additional interview was conducted with the QRMD who stated they do not have a plan for not receiving the calls from the telemetry contractor. Their plan was to change providers as quickly as possible. The QRMD further stated they had a QAPI meeting on 02/11/2025 at 2:00 PM to discuss the incident on 01/21/2025, but only the patient fall was discussed. There has not been a QAPI meeting regarding telemetry issues. She stated they report events a quarter behind and this event has not yet been officially reported to the governing body as it meets tomorrow, 02/21/2025. She stated unofficially everyone on the governing body was aware of the event but there has not been a formal meeting since the event happened. The QRMD stated a root cause analysis was completed on the 01/21/2025 event but she could not provide the report because of the Patient Safety Organization (PSO) confidentiality rule (protects the privacy of data submitted to a PSO to analyze and learn from patient safety events without fear of repercussions). On 02/21/2025 at approximately 10:34 AM, an additional interview was conducted with the CNO who stated he has worked at the facility about 2 ½ years and during that time there have been issues with telemetry connectivity. The CNO further stated the facility does not track calls from the telemetry contractor or when they are notified of a telemetry monitor being offline and the telemetry contractor does not provide in house monitors for the hospital staff to see patient telemetry in real time. The CNO stated patient room #108 was a room that he knows has a dead spot. He has not instructed the supervisors not to admit patients to that room as they do not know if a patient will be ordered telemetry prior to being admitted. On 02/21/2025 at approximately 11:41 AM, an additional interview was conducted with the QRMD who stated Patient #1 left with EMS on 01/21/2025 with code (CPR) in progress. The receiving facility notified the family that the patient had died, and the family later notified our Chief Executive Officer the patient had died. The QRMD further stated she was communicating with the VPO of the contracted telemetry company via telephone only but began email communication with him starting last week. She did not maintain a log of the phone calls to the VPO. The VPO was supposed to provide an action plan related to the incident which she requested on 01/22/2025. The VPO provided an action plan on 02/19/2025; however, the QRMD did not feel the plan was adequate and did not use it. The hospital initiated discussions on a corrective action plan for telemetry services on 02/19/2025. The QRMD reiterated on 02/11/2025 a quality improvement meeting was held and they did a workflow analysis for the purpose of putting telemetry on patients. They did not discuss services with the contracted telemetry company, the patient incident on 01/21/2025 or their concerns with current telemetry. The QRMD stated there were no quality improvement meeting minutes regarding telemetry to review as they have not had a meeting to discuss telemetry concerns. On 02/21/2025 at approximately 1:00 PM, an additional interview was conducted with RT C who reported the hospital has had connectivity issues with the telemetry contractor for at least a year. RT C further stated he receives frequent calls from the telemetry contractor about patients going offline, but no log of the calls was kept. He stated telemetry connectivity issues were more prevalent in patient rooms around the central nurses’ station which were rooms 104, 105, 106, 107, and 108. The hospital provided a list of room locations for all patients receiving telemetry services for each day of the survey. On 02/19/2025, there were patients in both rooms 107 and 108 with orders for telemetry services and there was a patient in room 107 receiving telemetry services on 02/20/2025 and 02/21/2025. Review of the Remote Telemetry Monitoring policy, revised on 04/09/2022, was conducted. On page 1 it states, “This program will allow patients to be monitored 24-hours a day for a period of time as defined by the physician.” On page 2, under Significant cardiac rhythm disturbance, it states, “In the event of a significant cardiac rhythm disturbance, (name of the telemetry contractor) will call the supervisor phone to inform the staff of the change.” Review of the facility’s contract with (name of the telemetry contractor) for telemetry services found the contract’s effective date was 09/24/2019. On page 2, 3.1 it reads, “At the request of a Participating Hospital, Supplier shall provide cardiac monitoring services, to patients of such Participating Hospitals in accordance with all applicable federal and state laws and regulations and protocols lawfully set forth by participating hospital. All equipment, tools, materials and supplies required to perform the Services shall be selected by the Supplier in its sole discretion, and supplied by the Supplier, at Supplier’s expense.” 50447”

    Rule A0286. Standard-level. From a complaint.

The one inspection in the last three years
Inspections on record
DateVisitWhat the record says
Feb 21, 2025Complaint inspection4 deficiencies cited

How do patients fare?

  • 69.45% of its patients returned home or to the community: better than the national rate, as CMS compares it (Oct 1, 2023 to Sep 30, 2025).
  • Compared by CMS: potentially preventable readmissions within 30 days after discharge, no different than the national rate (9.82%); potentially preventable readmissions during the stay, no different than the national rate (5.71%); catheter urinary tract infections (CAUTI), no different than the national benchmark (standardized infection ratio 0.623); C. diff infections, no different than the national benchmark (standardized infection ratio 0.753).
  • As CMS gives them: patients with one or more falls with major injury, 0.2%; patients with new or worsened pressure ulcers or injuries, 0.54%; patients at or above an expected ability to care for themselves and move around at discharge, 83.92%; Medicare spending per patient (1 is the national median), 1.09.
Source:

CMS, Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility - Provider Data. Released Sep 23, 2026. Updated quarterly.

Is it certified?

  • Medicare-certified inpatient rehabilitation facility since Apr 28, 1997.
  • Ownership: for profit.
  • It is accredited by The Joint Commission, whose surveys stand in for the state’s routine inspections.
  • Cited at in the last three years: it didn’t meet a whole condition of Medicare’s rules for hospitals.
  • For profit.
Source:

CMS, Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility - General Information. Released Sep 23, 2026. Updated quarterly.

CMS, Provider of Services File - Hospital & Non-Hospital Facilities. Released Oct 14, 2026. Updated quarterly.

CMS, QCOR Hospital 2567 statements of deficiencies. Released Oct 20, 2026. Updated monthly.

Has it been penalized?

  • CMS doesn’t publish fines or other penalties for these facilities.
  • 4 deficiencies cited in the last three years came from inspections that included a complaint investigation.
Source:

CMS, Provider of Services File - Hospital & Non-Hospital Facilities. Released Oct 14, 2026. Updated quarterly.

CMS, QCOR Hospital 2567 statements of deficiencies. Released Oct 20, 2026. Updated monthly.

Who does the caring?

  • CMS doesn’t publish staffing levels for these facilities.
  • 66.67% of its health care workers got a flu shot (Oct 1, 2024 to Mar 31, 2025).
Source:

CMS, Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility - Provider Data. Released Sep 23, 2026. Updated quarterly.

Who owns it?

  • Encompass Health Corporation owns 100% directly since May 10, 1994.
  • Encompass Health Corporation runs it.
  • 14 owners or officers are people: Edmund M Fay (corporate officer, 0%); John Ryan Wilson (corporate officer, 0%); John Patrick Darby (corporate officer, 0%); Andrew L Price (corporate officer, 0%); Carey B Mcrae (corporate officer, 0%); Douglas E Coltharp (corporate officer, 0%); Mark J Tarr (runs it (operational or managerial control), 0%); Melanie Van Reenen Lewis (corporate officer, 0%); Robert W Mccallum (corporate officer, 0%); Ronnie Wagley (corporate officer, 0%); Stephen D Leasure (corporate officer, 0%); Tony N Bennett (managing employee (on the payroll), 0%); Thomas Hamilton Boyle (corporate officer, 0%); Edmund Howard Ball (corporate officer, 0%).
  • CMS’s Provider of Services file records no change of ownership.
  • No private-equity firm among the owners CMS lists.
  • No real-estate investment trust among the owners CMS lists.
Source:

CMS, Hospital All Owners and Hospital Enrollments. Released Sep 29, 2026. Updated monthly.

CMS, Provider of Services File - Hospital & Non-Hospital Facilities. Released Oct 14, 2026. Updated quarterly.

Organisations CMS lists
OrganisationRoleShareSince
Encompass Health CorporationOwns 5% or more directly100%May 10, 1994
Truist BankHolds 5% or more security interest100%Mar 9, 2026
Vanguard Group Inc.Owns 5% or more through other companies10.1%Dec 31, 2025
Blackrock Inc.Owns 5% or more through other companies9.1%Dec 31, 2025
T Rowe Price Associates Inc.Owns 5% or more through other companies5.1%Jun 30, 2026
Encompass Health CorporationRuns it (operational or managerial control)May 10, 1994

How does it compare nearby?

  • Of the 2 inpatient rehabilitation facilities CMS lists in Bay County, 2 have CMS’s comparison of their discharges to the community with the national rate: 2 better than the national rate.
  • CMS rates this one better than the national rate for returning patients to the community.
Source:

CMS, Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility - Provider Data. Released Sep 23, 2026. Updated quarterly.

1 compared
PlaceDischarged to the community
HCA Florida Gulf Coast Hospital73.4

What the record doesn’t say

  • CMS doesn’t publish fines or other penalties for inpatient rehabilitation facilities or long-term care hospitals, so none are shown.
  • Only complaints that led to a citation appear; complaints that didn’t aren’t published.
  • Many of these facilities are accredited by a private organisation (The Joint Commission, DNV and others) whose routine inspections stand in for the state’s; those reports aren’t public, and QCOR holds only the state’s surveys: no inspection on record here doesn’t mean none took place.
  • QCOR says its hospital inspection data are complete only through September 17, 2026, while it moves to a new system.
  • CMS doesn’t publish staffing levels for these facilities.

Sources

If you believe something here is wrong, a correction starts with the agency whose record this copies: CMS. CMS’s own record is on Care Compare. If Hearth Record copied something wrongly, it will fix it and log the correction publicly, with its date: how corrections work.

Source:

This copy of the record was made on Nov 5, 2026.

From the facility

The public record above comes first. Anything the facility adds will appear here, below it, and say who wrote it.

Replies

None. Replies aren’t open yet. When they open, the facility will be able to answer any finding for free, and the reply will show beside that finding, unedited and dated.

Paid listing

None. Paid listings aren’t open yet. When they open, anything paid for will say “Paid by the facility”, and paying will never change a finding, a rating or the order of results.

How to read a record

Four things every record does, shown on an example record made up for this guide.

An example record, made up for this guide

An example nursing home

Made up for this guide: no real place is shown

Not fully inspected in over two years (CMS flag)

11 health citations at the latest inspection cycle

The state average is 14.3.

Source:

CMS, State and US Averages and Health Deficiencies. Released Oct 28, 2026. Updated monthly.

From the homeNone yet. Replies and paid listings aren’t open, and when they open they will sit here, below the record.

1 of 4

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