Hearth Record

HCA Florida Fort Walton-Destin Hospital

An acute care hospital in Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32547

1000 Mar-Walt Dr, Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32547. (850) 862-1111.

CMS’s own record, on Care Compare

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The short answer

Record last released by CMS on Oct 20, 2026.

The last 24 months 4 deficiencies in 2 months of the last 36. Last cited May 2025. Most serious: Condition-level. Every month

Each figure’s source sits beside it, in its section below.

What these words mean4
Star ratings
CMS rates some kinds of place from 1 to 5 stars, more stars meaning better on CMS’s own measures for that kind: for a nursing home, its health inspections, staffing and quality measures. A rating is CMS’s summary of those measures; it doesn’t promise good care. Source: CMS, Care Compare and the Five-Star Quality Rating System.
Inspection (survey)
A visit by state inspectors, often unannounced, who check a place against the rules it must meet. For nursing homes and other places Medicare pays, CMS calls these visits surveys: a standard survey of a nursing home comes at least every 15 months, and a complaint survey whenever a complaint calls for one. Source: CMS; 42 CFR 488.308.
Deficiency, citation, violation
What inspectors write up when a place didn’t meet a rule: the rule, what they saw, and when. CMS calls it a deficiency; states may say citation or violation. It is the inspectors’ finding, not a court’s, and the place is usually asked for a plan to correct it. Source: CMS, statement of deficiencies (Form CMS-2567); each state’s licensing agency.
Condition-level deficiency
For hospices, home health agencies, hospitals and dialysis facilities, CMS writes deficiencies at two levels. Standard is the usual one; condition-level is the more serious, when a problem is serious enough that the provider doesn’t meet a whole condition of taking part in Medicare. Source: CMS, State Operations Manual.

What did inspectors find?

The last inspection on record was on Jan 6, 2026: a complaint inspection.

4 deficiencies cited in the last three years, 1 of them at condition level, the most serious, 2 of them under EMTALA, the law requiring an emergency department to examine and stabilise anyone who comes to it.

1 deficiency at condition level, the more serious of CMS’s two levels

Source:

CMS, QCOR Hospital 2567 statements of deficiencies. Released Oct 20, 2026. Updated monthly.

When those deficiencies happened

4 deficiencies in 2 months of the last 36. Last cited May 2025. Most serious: Condition-level. The last 3 years, to Nov 5, 2026.

4 deficiencies by month over the last 3 years. Each cell is one month.
JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDec
2023 Dec
2024 JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDec
2025 JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDec
2026 JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNov

Hover or focus a month to read it.

No visit on record Visited, nothing cited A stronger orange is more serious, on its source’s own levels, read onto four bands: from the least serious it publishes to the most
Source:

Hearth Record drew this from the dates and levels in the source’s own records.

Each deficiency, as cited

Rule titles as CMS’s inspectors cite them, set in sentence case.

Source:

CMS, QCOR Hospital 2567 statements of deficiencies. Released Oct 20, 2026. Updated monthly.

May 21, 2025: complaint inspection2 deficiencies
  • Patient Rights

    The inspectors’ words, 543 words

    “PATIENT RIGHTS CFR(s): 482.13 A hospital must protect and promote each patient’s rights. This Condition is not met as evidenced by: 39374 Based on review of video surveillance, record review, interviews, and policy review, the facility failed to ensure the safety of patients receiving care in behavioral health unit (south) when staff failed to complete 15-minute patient monitoring rounds on 18 of 22 patients, resulting in one patient death from suicide (Patient #1), and failed to enter an order for increased patient monitoring for 1 of 3 patients sampled (Patient #1). Refer to A0144, Standard. The findings included: The facility provided and demonstrated a mitigation plan for the events which led to the death of Patient #1 on 4/26/2025 which was implemented prior to the survey. 1. All scheduled staff members will complete a safety rounding expectation attestation and an in-person competency check by May 9th, 2025. This plan was implemented and documented prior to the survey and confirmed through onsite review of signatures. Interviews with mental health technician (MHT) F on 5/14/2025 at 2:00pm, registered nurse (RN) C on 5/14/2025 at 2:15pm, and RN D 5/14/2025 at 3:18pm. 2. Department director or their designee will complete 20 live (in person) patient safety rounding audits per week. Completed audit tools were reviewed onsite. Sampled and reviewed 11 audits which were completed between 5/9/2025 and 5/12/2025. 3. Department director or their designee will complete 3 video audit reviews per week. Audits will be completed on one day, one night, and one weekend shift and cover a minimum of 2 consecutive hours of rounding activity to validate the patient safety round was performed to standard. - Video was reviewed onsite and this measure was confirmed as implemented in an interview with the director of quality on 5/15/2025 at 2:00pm. 4. Patients with an increased level of observation will be included on the end of shift report for department director/manager order review. This was confirmed through observation of house supervisor end of shift report and interviews with Clinical Nurse Coordinator, RN C on 5/14/2025 at 2:15pm and house supervisor, RN H on 5/15/2025 at 4:30pm. 5. Staff members will perform an environmental safety round each change of shift, to include all spaces of the patient room and bathroom to ensure that there are no concerns for self-harm in the care area i.e. excess linens, patient items that have been altered to potentially cause harm, or other contraband. Any items that are found will be removed immediately. - This was confirmed through onsite observation and video surveillance observation on 5/15/2025 at 3:05 - 3:20pm. Additionally, the facility removed shower curtains from the behavioral health units and reported the failure of the breakaway function for ligature-resistant shower curtain hooks to the product distributor. The medical director of the behavioral health unit communicated the expectations for order entry for escalated patient monitoring to providers serving the behavioral health unit, per interview on 5/16/2025 at 12:14pm. The director of quality confirmed in an email received on 5/21/2025 at 5:10pm that MHT A was removed from patient care at 12:30pm on 4/26/2025. At the time of the survey, MHT A was suspended pending investigation and per interview with the director of quality on 5/16/2025, the hospital terminated employment of MHT A.”

    Rule A0115. Condition-level. From a complaint.

  • Patient Rights: Care In Safe Setting

    The inspectors’ words, 3,779 words

    “PATIENT RIGHTS: CARE IN SAFE SETTING CFR(s): 482.13(c)(2) The patient has the right to receive care in a safe setting. This Standard is not met as evidenced by: 39374 Based on review of video surveillance, record review, interviews, and policy review, the facility failed to ensure the patients’ right to a safe environment when staff failed to complete 15-minute patient monitoring rounds on 18 of 22 patients, resulting in one patient death from suicide (Patient #1), and failed to enter an order for increased patient monitoring for 1 of 3 patients sampled (Patient #1). The findings include: A medical record review found that Patient #1 was admitted to the behavioral health unit of the hospital on the evening of 4/24/2025 after presenting to the emergency department voluntarily seeking help for auditory hallucinations and being off psychiatric medications for about 2 weeks. The admission/shift assessment, documented 04/24/2025 at 6:17pm identified the patient in the BH setting: Mod: Close Observation & Re-evaluation. Place patient on close observation, minimally with every 15 min checks completed and documented. Consider need for continuous observation based on patient’s ability to cooperate, follow verbal cues and maintain safety.” The record included several assessments for suicide risk including documentation on 4/24/2025 at 10:55pm which indicated Patient #1 did not have suicidal thoughts and had not attempted, planned to attempt, or prepared to end life since last contact. 04/25/25 at 09:30am, note electronically signed by Dr. G. Includes mental status examination indicating affect is moderately anxious, tearful. Patient does not appear to be responding to internal stimuli. Patient denies any thoughts of self harm or harm to others, thought process is concrete, focused on his dog. Insight is poor, judgment is poor at this time. Attention and concentration were adequate for interview. Clinical impression: Schizophrenia and Amphetamine abuse. Plan - continue involuntary psychiatric admission for further stabilization. Medications were restarted. Overall level suicide risk: low risk. RN Shift assessment documented on 4/25/2025 at 4:53PM by Employee D, a registered nurse (RN), documented Patient #1, Paranoid ideation/delusions hallucinations: “Present/Exists.: Delusions: “Persecution”. Statement of delusion indicates - “Believe(s) the sheriff is out to get him and put him in jail for life. as having “non-specific active suicidal thoughts since last contact: yes. wish to be dead or not wake up since last contact: no; active ideation with plan and intent since last contact: no. - Calculated suicide risk level: Moderate risk” A subsequent note entered by Employee D on 4/25/2025 at 5:27pm noted “Patient has been anxious, tearful, and upset because he can’t find his dog. Believes the police took the dog. Patient would not make suggested calls to find the location or what happened to his dog but later did call a girlfriend and patient found the whereabouts of his dog. Also, patient informed staff that he was looking for a way to kill himself on the unit, like the shower curtain can be used to hang himself. Tech sat with patient and later patient on LOS (line of sight) in front of nurses’ station. Doctor informed (used name of Employee G, the psychiatrist involved in Patient #1. When assessed concerning SI (suicidal ideation), patient states the reason he is having suicidal ideation is because the sheriff wants to arrest him and put him in jail for the rest of his life. No charges against patient that would be a life sentence. Patient states ‘oh, the sheriff is trumping up charges on him; he has his ways.’ Patients given Seroquel 50 milligrams and Ativan per order. Patient is sitting in front of the nurses’ desk with blanket over body and crying until patient fell asleep. Patient reassessed and patient states he is feeling much better now that he found out his dog is safe and no longer SI (suicidal ideation). Note that while patient was on line of sight patient talking to people that were not there and reaching out and trying to grab at things that were not there. Patients eat well and taking medications. Patient appeared disheveled but took a shower and cleaned this afternoon and states it also helped him feel better, the shower.” A suicide risk assessment completed on 4/26/2025 at 1:14am indicated “non-specific active suicidal thoughts since last contact: “yes.”; active ideation without method, plan or intent since last contact: “Yes”; Active ideation with some intent and wo plan since last contact: No; Active suicidal ideation with plan an intent since last contact: No; Attempted, planned to attempt, or prepared to end life since last contact; “No”; Calculated suicide risk level: “Moderate risk.” Nurse note, 04/26/2025 at 07:41am indicates 1900-0700: [Patient] is in milieu watching TV but isolates to self. He is disorganized and illogical. Endorses SI (suicidal ideation) due to OCSO (Okaloosa County Sheriffs Office) wanting to arrest him denies HI (Homicidal ideation)/AVH (Auditory Verbal Hallucinations). He is ‘medication’ adherent. He ate snack and appears to have slept 6.5+ hours as of 0630. Plan of care and safety monitoring ongoing.” A late entry noted “4/26/2025 at 10:18am **based on video review, staff interview, and observation of actual events** Patient was found in patient bathroom with shower curtain tied around his neck. CPR was initiated and Code Blue activated. Time of death pronounced at 10:41am.” In an interview with the nursing director for behavioral health, RN J, on 5/14/2025 at 2:44pm, she explained that all patients in the behavioral health unit are on patient monitoring rounds of no less than every 15 minutes unless there is an indication for more frequent monitoring such as line of sight or one-to-one monitoring. A review of the Patient Monitoring form for Patient #1 for 4/26/2025, marked as “Standard (q15)” monitoring which begins at 12:00am indicated he was in bed sleeping between 12:00am and 6:30am, at the medication room (in line) at 6:45am, in the unit milieu interacting at 7:00am, in the unit milieu watching tv at 7:15 and 7:30am, and illegible markings are noted on the form for the 7:45, 8:00, 8:15, 8:30, 8:45, and 9:00am time slots. According to a review of recorded video surveillance, Patient #1 was observed in the common area at 7:00am, observed on the phone around 8:45am, and observed returning to his room at 9:02am. The form was signed off for each 15-minute increment from 12:00am through 10:0am and blank after the 10:00am time slot. The 9:15am, 9:30am, 9:45am, and 10:am time slots were initialed by mental health technician (MHT) A. On 5/14/2025 at 4:10pm, MHT A stated in an interview that she did not perform these checks. This was also confirmed through video observation of the period between 8:00am - 10:18am. The notations by MHT A at 9:15, 9:30, 9:45, and 10:00am all noted the code “2H” indicating the patient was in his room and quiet during these observations. MHT A described the events of the morning of 4/26/2025 as “the whole reason this is happening is because I was slacking and not keeping up with the q15 (minute) rounds. I was doing other stuff and got behind. I was helping other patients with their belongings, and I was on the computer. I was doing work stuff on the computer. We chart groups. I was charting the morning group. It was me being very tired and having a bad day and I just slacked off. There were 2 techs, including myself (me and one other person), there were 3 nurses and there were around 26-28 patients. That is typical.” When asked if she has help, MHT A responded, “It depends on the nurse. I don’t like asking the nurses for help, now I see that I should. If nurses don’t offer to help, I just do it myself.” There were no observations made for patient #1 from 09:03am, until the time he was found deceased at 10:18am. The census on the behavioral health unit where Patient # 1 was admitted on 4/26/2025 was 22. A review of the Patient Monitoring forms for all 22 patients on 4/26/2025 included documentation by MHT A. There were 2 patients (11 and #20) who were missing documentation in the time slots for 10:15am and 10:30am. The following patients were documented as having been “in bed” by MHT A during the period between 8:00am when the last round was observed in the patient room halls by the nurse and 10:18am when the code blue for Patient #1 was initiated: Patient #1, #4, #5, #6, #7, #8, #9, #10, #11, #12, #13, #16, #18, #19, #20, #21, #22, and #23. On 5/14/2025 at 3:18pm, an interview took place with registered nurse (RN) D, who was assigned on 4/25/2025 to the behavioral health unit of the hospital where Patient #1 was admitted. During the interview, RN D said she was the nurse who spoke with Doctor G, the psychiatrist overseeing the care of Patient #1 on 4/25/2025. RN D confirmed that she informed Doctor G in a face-to-face conversation of concerns for suicidal ideation by Patient #1. She stated, Doctor G thought this was due to the patient being off medications for two weeks and thought restarting the medications would help. She said Doctor G ordered the medications which were administered to Patient #1 that day. As she remembered the conversation, RN D said, “Doctor G didn’t think after talking with the patient earlier that he was suicidal, so I just kept him online-of-site.” RN D described the interactions with Patient #1 on 4/25/2025 as “Patient #1 voiced the suicidal thoughts after breakfast and before lunch. I worked till about 6 - 6:15pm. Patient #1 was sitting in front and talking to himself when no one was there. He was reaching into the nurses’ station grabbing for things that weren’t there. Later the techs went with him to take a shower, and he said he felt better. I saw him at dinner, quieter and not so anxious. He wasn’t real paranoid about the cops or anything at that time. There was no indication for the rest of the day that he should have been on one to one. Through different conversations with the techs, he didn’t seem like he was going to kill himself. He was very worried about his dog, but he had calmed down about that. When he found out the dog was safe and ok, he said he felt better and less anxious.” Regarding the use of shower curtains on the unit, RN D said, “We could have taken the shower curtain down. He said he was looking for things. The decision not to remove it was based on the fact that the shower curtain was supposed to break and when they move the shower curtains, they (the shower curtains) fall. We don’t want the patients to think we are going to take everything away from them. It seemed like he was calm. He did say that he was looking for things like the shower curtain to kill himself, but because we knew that the shower curtains break away and he was on line-of-site, we didn’t think we needed to take it away. If we think the patient is going to smuggle utensils and use them to self-harm, we have put them on finger foods. We do take things and assess for that, but we didn’t think that he was at risk at the time after calming down. During the day while he was still on line-of-site, the techs did go with him to check on him while he was showering. When he showered, he got dressed and came back out, he didn’t make any attempt during the shower to mess with the curtain.” During a tour of the unit on 5/14/2025 at approximately 1:45pm - 2:15pm, an observation was made of a patient room and bathroom. There was no shower curtain present. In an interview during the tour, the nursing director of the behavioral health unit, RN J, said all shower curtains on the unit have been removed from all bathrooms. There were no other obvious ligature risks observed, and door handles, faucets, and furniture were observed to be the type commonly seen in a behavioral health setting and designed to reduce ligature risk. In a follow up interview with the vice president of quality/risk management and the director of quality on 5/14/2025 at approximately 3:10pm, the director of quality said the shower rods and hooks have all been removed. The shower curtain hooks that were used on the unit when Patient #1 used the shower curtain as a strangulation device, were “ligature approved and supposed to break away with tension. Each hook was supposed to have been weight rated for 10 pounds of tension. These have now been removed from all the organization’s facilities, and this has been reported to the product distributor.” On 5/16/2025 at 12:14pm, the medical director for behavioral health services was interviewed and said he has been working at the facility since 2017 and safety of shower curtains has been addressed to ensure safety several times and “in the time I’ve been here, this is the third version of shower curtains, and we had confidence of the breakaway curtains functioning as expected.” An interview took place on 5/14/2025 at approximately 2:15pm with RN C, the charge nurse working on the behavioral unit and who was also the charge nurse on the unit on 4/26/2025, the day Patient #1 was found deceased in his bathroom. Describing the events that took place on 4/26/2025 and what has occurred since the events of 4/26/2025, RN C described “there was a tech that had not done what she was supposed to do that day. There were several rounds that were missed. There is much more rounding now and I am doing much more rounding with staff and observing their rounds.” RN C was not aware that Patient #1 had voiced feelings of self-harm and described Patient #1 as “bright and talking and progressing and doing better” and expressed that there was no indication that morning that Patient #1 required an increased level of monitoring. An interview was conducted with Doctor G on 5/14/2025 at 3:46pm. Doctor G described meeting Patient #1 on 4/25/2025 in the morning and that Patient #1 was tearful about his dog and emotional, very focused on that and forward thinking. Patient #1 said he needed to get into a detox program, and he did have some plans for when he left. Doctor G said, in terms of his evaluation of Patient #1 for suicide risk, “the forward-thinking behaviors were promising.” Doctor G went on to describe that RN D “said he made comments about wanting to hang himself, this was about 9am, and we put in meds (medication orders) at that time. RN D said they would keep him at the nurses’ station and on line-of-site.” In a follow up interview with Doctor G on 5/16/2025 at 12:05pm, regarding placing an order in the electronic medical record for line of sight monitoring, Doctor G said “From my understanding right after I had seen Patient #1, RN D told me about the voicing suicidal ideation, but when he was with me just prior to this, he was not voicing suicidal ideation and was very concerned about the dog. Patient #1 wasn’t SI (suicidal ideation) with me, he wanted to get back into a detox program. He was more forward thinking. In terms of RN D saying that, I don’t know the timeframe when she first heard that, but I was going to put the medications in for him. We did not talk about who would enter the order (for line-of-sight monitoring). I would say, classically, it all falls on my shoulders. In terms of putting in orders that a nurse comes to me with. In terms of the follow up, the facility has reinforced that nursing can put in the order, if the doctor is not in front of the computer. It can only be de-escalated by a provider. In moving forward, we have discussed how to better ensure those orders about behavior monitoring have been addressed. In terms of that day, the intervention was there, the order wasn’t. If they had come back to me that day, he would have been taken off the line of site that evening around 4-5pm. During every evening, I read notes at home one last time and I saw RN D’s note, and I feel comfortable that every patient was reviewed. The note was clearly there. From a reflective perspective, I can’t say I would have done anything different. RN D came to me, the interventions were implemented, and the reassessment was that he was no longer suicidal, and I would have discontinued the line of site then. The patient was also seen going to get his medication just before a phone call immediately before the (death) event took place, so I just keep going over in my head, that doesn’t make sense that he came out to get his meds, then did this, it doesn’t track with suicidal behavior and wouldn’t have triggered an intervention.” In an interview with the medical director for behavioral health, Doctor I, on 5/16/2025 at 12:14pm, he said “It would have been an expectation to do a separate note to document the need for the line of sight or to amend the intake note to add the description of what happened that warranted line of sight and to put in the order, if he was on the unit and accessible. With Doctor G being in house, that was our failure to put the order in and the documentation justifying that. We have had some conversations since then to ensure that our providers understand that changing the level requires an order and it can be co-signed or put in if available. Going in reverse, we do not want to reduce the coverage until the order is in and documentation is in to justify the reduction in level of monitoring. We understand from a provider standpoint that we added to the level of confusion about what monitoring the patient should have been on, but clinically, the end result would have been the same. He (Patient #1) would have been back on q15 (every 15 minutes) observation the evening of the 25th. Objectively, his emotions and behavior resolved. He was no longer covering his head with a blanket and his affect was stable. By that evening he would have been on q15.” A review of a position description for a “Mental Health Technician II” signed by MHT A on 12/05/2023 includes a description of duties to include “provides and documents on patient care and observes patient behaviors based on the nursing process, established hospital policies and procedures, unit specific policies and procedures, and/or Standards of Care/Practice. Participates in the safety rounds rotation. Maintains accurate and detailed documentation of assigned safety rounds. Observes reports and documents the patient’s physiological and psychological status, informing a registered nurse of any incongruencies in the above.” The director of quality confirmed in an email received on 5/21/2025 at 5:10pm that MHT A was removed from patient care at 12:30pm on 4/26/2025. At the time of the survey, MHT A was suspended pending investigation and per interview with the director of quality on 5/16/2025, the hospital terminated employment of MHT A. A policy titled “Guidance for Standard and Special Observation”,” PolicyStat number 17353486, with an effective/approved date of 1/17/2025 and most recent revision documented as October, 2024 was reviewed and included the following Guidance Procedure: “To maintain the safety of each patient and the stability of the therapeutic milieu. All patients are monitored as to their location and activity at regular intervals. The degree of this monitoring is dependent upon the individual patient’s assessment and needs. A. The Clinical Nurse Coordinator (CNC) or designee on each shift will assign the 15-minute Patient Monitoring and document these assignments on the Shift Assignment Form. B. The assigned staff member(s) personally locates each patient listed and documents the patient’s location and safety on the Patient Monitoring form under the appropriate time column. The staff member places his/her initials at the top of the column above the time. At the time of joint rounds, both staff members initial the Patient Monitoring form. C. While making the patient monitoring round, the staff member observes the environment for safety risks.” H. If the patient is in their room, the staff member must enter the room to observe the condition of the patient. When a patient appears to be sleeping/ resting, staff should observe the rise and fall of the chest. The policy also included that “The attending physician/provider orders the implementation, discontinuation, or change in the standard level of q15 min (every 15 minutes) patient monitoring. An RN or therapist may increase a patients’ level of monitoring prior to contacting the physician for orders. Clinical Assessment justifies implementation of the least restrictive and most appropriate level of monitoring. A. Obtain a provider order for the specific level of monitoring required. 1. The attending physician, provider, RN, or therapist assesses the patient and implements the appropriate level of monitoring. 2. If a therapist or RN implements any level other than standard monitoring (q15 minute checks) the RN must also contact the attending/ covering provider to obtain the appropriate order. 3. The provider’s order includes the designated level and the reason for the increase level of monitoring (suicidal risk, 1:1 or continuous observation elopement risk). B. The reason and procedure for this level of monitoring is explained to the patient. C. A provider’s order is necessary to discontinue or change the level of monitoring. The policy also contained instructions for ensuring a quality assurance process of the monitoring as follows: Quality Monitoring o Patient Monitoring Rounds and q2 (every 2) hour Nursing Rounds - o Audits are performed monthly and reviewed for overall percentage compliance. o BHS (behavioral health service) Leadership, House Supervisors, or any Hospital Executives rounding on the Behavioral Health Unit (BHU) will randomly review the patient monitoring form to identify accuracy and timeliness. When variations are found, these should be addressed immediately and reported to the BH executive, or appropriate nursing/ quality leader as soon as possible for follow-up. The number of patient monitoring forms reviewed each month is determined by the facility’s leadership. o Video Review Monthly Requirements - At a minimum of twice per month, each shift, each unit, should be monitored for staff’s correct performance of safety checks while rounding. The review shall capture a cross section of staff to assess accountability and competence. o Video review may be competed by BHS Leadership, Hospital Leadership, CNC or designee o Reviews shall include weekends and holiday shifts. o A minimum of one hour of video review should be conducted.”

    Rule A0144. Standard-level. From a complaint.

Feb 23, 2024: complaint inspection2 deficiencies
  • Compliance With 489.24

    The inspectors’ words, 164 words

    “COMPLIANCE WITH 489.24 CFR(s): 489.20(l) [The provider agrees,] in the case of a hospital as defined in §489.24(b), to comply with §489.24. This Standard is not met as evidenced by: 41185 Based on physician interview, nurse midwife interview, additional emergency room staff interview, medical record review and review of policy and procedures, the hospital failed to provide an appropriate transfer for one of 20 sampled patients, Patient #1. The physician verbalized that the discharge plan for patient #1 was to proceed directly to her primary obstetrician at a local hospital about 46 miles away. The findings include: The hospital failed to contact or provide medical records upon discharge to Patient #1, Patient #1’s primary physician, and the receiving hospital. The physician verbalized that Patient #1 declined transfer, however, the hospital did not maintain a written transfer certification signed by the physician documenting the medical benefits reasonably expected from medical treatment at another facility outweigh the risk and benefits of transfer. Cross Refer to A2409.”

    Rule A2400. Standard-level. From a complaint.

  • Appropriate Transfer

    The inspectors’ words, 2,637 words

    “APPROPRIATE TRANSFER CFR(s): 489.24(e)(1)-(2) (1) General If an individual at a hospital has an emergency medical condition that has not been stabilized (as defined in paragraph (b) of this section), the hospital may not transfer the individual unless - (i) The transfer is an appropriate transfer (within the meaning of paragraph (e)(2) of this section); and (ii)(A) The individual (or a legally responsible person acting on the individual’s behalf) requests the transfer, after being informed of the hospital’s obligations under this section and of the risk of transfer. The request must be in writing and indicate the reasons for the request as well as indicate that he or she is aware of the risks and benefits of the transfer. (B) A physician (within the meaning of section 1861(r)(1) of the Act) has signed a certification that, based upon the information available at the time of transfer, the medical benefits reasonably expected from the provision of appropriate medical treatment at another medical facility outweigh the increased risks to the individual or, in the case of a woman in labor, to the woman or the unborn child, from being transferred. The certification must contain a summary of the risks and benefits upon which it is based; or (C) If a physician is not physically present in the emergency department at the time an individual is transferred, a qualified medical person (as determined by the hospital in its bylaws or rules and regulations) has signed a certification described in paragraph (e)(1)(ii)(B) of this section after a physician (as defined in section 1861(r)(1) of the Act) in consultation with the qualified medical person, agrees with the certification and subsequently countersigns the certification. The certification must contain a summary of the risks and benefits upon which it is based. (2) A transfer to another medical facility will be appropriate only in those cases in which - (i) The transferring hospital provides medical treatment within its capacity that minimizes the risks to the individual’s health and, in the case of a woman in labor, the health of the unborn child; (ii) The receiving facility (A) Has available space and qualified personnel for the treatment of the individual; and (B) Has agreed to accept transfer of the individual and to provide appropriate medical treatment. (iii) The transferring hospital sends to the receiving facility all medical records (or copies thereof) related to the emergency condition which the individual has presented that are available at the time of the transfer, including available history, records related to the individual’s emergency medical condition, observations of signs or symptoms, preliminary diagnosis, results of diagnostic studies or telephone reports of the studies, treatment provided, results of any tests and the informed written consent or certification (or copy thereof) required under paragraph (e)(1)(ii) of this section, and the name and address of any on-call physician (described in paragraph (g) of this section) who has refused or failed to appear within a reasonable time to provide necessary stabilizing treatment. Other records (e.g., test results not yet available or historical records not readily available from the hospital’s files) must be sent as soon as practicable after transfer; and (iv) The transfer is effected through qualified personnel and transportation equipment, as required, including the use of necessary and medically appropriate life support measures during the transfer. This Standard is not met as evidenced by: 41185 Based on physician interview, nurse midwife interview, additional emergency room staff interview, medical record review and review of policy and procedures, the hospital failed to provide an appropriate transfer for one of 20 sampled patients, Patient #1. The physician verbalized that the discharge plan for patient #1 was to proceed directly to her primary obstetrician at a local hospital about 46 miles away. The hospital failed to contact or provide medical records upon discharge to the patient, patient’s primary physician, and the receiving hospital. The physician verbalized that Patient #1 declined transfer, however, the hospital did not maintain a written transfer certification signed by the physician documenting the medical benefits reasonably expected from medical treatment at another facility outweigh the risk and benefits of transfer. The findings include: On 02/22/2024 during review of Patient #1 medical record, staff C (physician) note dated 01/18/2024, 08:06am physician at bedside, discussed with patient (#1) and partner, pain out of proportion to stage of spurious labor, no clinical evidence of abruption. SVE (sterile vaginal exam) performed cervix is closed. Staff C discussed findings with patient #1, if pain is that severe, then recommend a cesarean section as no cervical change in over 8hrs. Patient #1 does not want cesarean section, our lab does not have Factor 8 available which will be necessary if we are to perform the cesarean section here. Patient #1 following consultation will go to Tertiary Care Center and discuss with patient #1’s primary obstetrician about delivery options. Documentation reviewed in Patient #1’s medical record was inconsistent with interviews with Physician C and CNMs (Certified Nurse Midwife) A and B, who all reported during interview they understood the patient would leave the hospital and travel by personal vehicle directly to the tertiary care center where the Maternal Fetal Medicine specialist who was Patient #1’s primary obstetrician (OB) was located and where she planned to deliver. No documentation or interview indicated the facility staff contacted Patient #1’s primary OB physician to discuss the plan of care, contacted the tertiary care center hospital to let them know Patient #1 was traveling there by personal vehicle, provided the patient with copies of records to provide when she arrived at the tertiary care center, or provided Patient #1’s medical records to the receiving hospital (Tertiary Care Center). No documentation of transfer was included in Patient #1’s medical record. Furthermore, Patient #1’s medical record did not contain documentation that the risks and benefits of declining the recommended cesarean section, transferring to the Tertiary Care Center (approximately 46 miles away), or discharging home and continuing the pregnancy were explained to Patient #1. No documentation of Patient #1 signing an “Against Medical Advice” or “Partial Refusal of Care” form or being asked to sign these in relation to declining the recommendation of a cesarean section and/or transferring via personal vehicle to the tertiary care center hospital were contained in the medical record. Patient #1’s medical record did not indicate education including the risk factors associated with uterine rupture. According to WebMD (accessed on 02/26/2024 at 5:32pm under the title “Uterine Rupture: What are Its Symptoms and How Is It Treated?” at webmd.com), “uterine rupture is most common among pregnant women who previously delivered a baby via a cesarean section. Some of the warning signs include sudden, severe uterine pain. On 02/22/2024 at approximately 02:37pm an interview was conducted with staff A (certified nurse midwife/CNM). Staff A on duty for patient #1 and monitored her care during her stay till end of shift on 01/18/2024 approximately 06:45am. Patient #1 was a previous cesarean section, had a lot of pain out of the ordinary, we treated her pain and I felt uncomfortable and wanted staff C (physician) to come see her, and he responded. Patient #1 had pain with contractions, pain was in the right lower quadrant after contraction, the uterus did relax on palpation, I sat with her at times just holding the monitor on. Patient #1 said she had seen her obstetrician the day before and discussed a VBAC (vaginal birth after cesarean) and that was her plan for delivery. Staff A added, I had no other issues with the fetal heart strip, just hard to keep patient#1 on the monitor, fetal movement was positive. On 02/23/2024 at approximately 10:20am an interview was conducted with staff G (Director of Women’s and Children’s). On 01/18/2024 a call was received from another facility inquiring about patient #1, the labor nurse for patient #1 answered the call and discussed the ultrasound and BPP report with the hospital staff nurse. Patient #1’s record was reviewed by staff G and standard of care was met as the conclusion. On 02/23/2024 at approximately 10:52am a telephone interview was conducted with staff C (physician). Staff C said, I came in to see patient #1 as staff A (Certified Nurse Midwife) had called to report patient #1 has had no cervical change, and still having pain. Staff C ordered an ultrasound and saw patient#1 at the bedside. Staff C performed a sterile vaginal exam, the cervix was still closed, no change from when patient #1 came in. Patient #1 was in pain, staff C offered patient #1 a cesarean section and discussed this with patient #1 and her husband. Patient #1 was planning a VBAC (vaginal birth after cesarean) at her local hospital. Patient #1 had met with her obstetrician the day before and discussed the risks of VBAC in detail and plan was to VBAC later that month. Staff C informed patient #1 her cervix was unchanged, and had been contracting at home from yesterday afternoon, and did not think patient#1 was a good candidate for VBAC. Patient #1 declined the cesarean section. Staff C stated in the interview he offered to transfer the patient to the other hospital as it is a Tertiary Care Center, as patient #1’s obstetrician is there. Patient #1 declined this, added it will be faster by personal car. Patient #1 added I would prefer to VBAC and go there. According to the interview,Staff C attempted to discuss risk factors of a VBAC, and patient #1 stated the risks were discussed with her obstetrician and she knew the risks already. On 02/23/2024 at approximately 12:15pm an interview was conducted with staff B (certified nurse midwife/CNM). Staff B came on duty at 06:45am on 01/18/2023, received hand off report from staff A (CNM). Staff A reported that patient#1’s pain was outside of her labor, history of a prior cesarean section and requested staff C (physician) to assess patient #1. Staff B was at bedside with staff C during assessment, the ultrasound was completed and reported as 8/8 for biophysical profile (BPP, test measures baby’s heart rate, muscle tone, movement, breathing, and the amount of amniotic fluid around the baby ). Patient #1 stated the risks and benefits of VBAC had been discussed the day before with her obstetrician and scheduled to have the VBAC at a local hospital in a few weeks. Staff C offered to transfer patient #1 to the other hospital and patient #1 refused the cesarean section and the transfer, patient #1 wanted to go there by personal car. Staff B did not disagree with staff C’s decision, patient#1 was not in good labor, had a reactive fetal heart strip, a reassuring BPP of 8/8. Staff B added, patient #1 was in a stable condition at discharge. On 2/22/2024 at approximately 12:38pm an interview was conducted with staff J (Emergency Services Director) explained that a “partial refusal of care” would include an example of when the patient is willing to transfer but refuses transportation because they don’t want to pay for an ambulance. Policy review conducted on 02/22/2024 revealed, EMTALA Transfer Policy dated 5/1/2019 with an expiration date of 5/1/2033. On page 4 of 16, paragraph 2. D. “Transfers for High Risk Deliveries. A hospital that is not capable of handling the delivery of a high-risk woman in labor must still provide an MSE (medical screening exam) and any necessary stabilizing treatment as well as meet the requirements of an appropriate transfer even if a transfer agreement is in place. In addition, a physician certification that the benefits of transfer outweigh the risks of transfer is required for the transfer of the woman in labor. Paragraph 2. G. “Women in Labor. For a woman in labor, a transfer may be made only if the woman in labor or her representative requests the transfer, or if a physician signs a certification that the benefits reasonably expected from the provision of appropriate medical treatment at another facility outweigh the increased risks to the individual or the woman in labor who requests transfer to another facility may not be discharged against medical advice to go to the other facility. The risks associated with such a disposition must be thoroughly explained to the patient and documented. If the patient still insists on leaving to go to the other facility, the facility should take all reasonable steps to obtain the patient’s request in writing and take all steps to have the patient transported using qualified personnel and transportation equipment. Transporting a woman in labor by privately-owned vehicle is not an appropriate form of transportation. The hospital’s EMTALA - MSE and Stabilization Policy effective 4/1/2018, approved 4/1/2018, expiration 4/1/2033 titled Florida - EMTALA Medical Screening Examination and Stabilization Policy. e. Extent of MSE varies by presenting symptoms. The MSE may vary depending on the individual’s signs and symptoms: ...ii. Pregnant Women: The medical records should show evidence that the screening examination includes, at a minimum, on-going evaluation of fetal heart tones, regularity and duration of uterine contractions, fetal position and station, cervical dilation, and status of membranes (i.e., ruptured, leaking and intact), to document whether or not the woman is in labor. A woman experiencing contractions is in true labor unless a physician, certified nurse-midwife or other QMP acting within his or her scope of practice as defined by the hospital’s medical staff bylaws and State medical practice acts, certifies in writing that after a reasonable time of observation, the woman is in false labor. The recommended timeframe for such physician certification of the QMP’s determination of false labor should be within 24 hours of the MSE, however, the medical staff bylaws, rules and regulations can provide guidance on the timeframe. Page 10 of 15 Procedure 6. Refusal to Consent to Treatment: a. Written Refusal - Partial Refusal of Care or Against Medical Advice. If a physician or QMP has begun the MSE or any necessary treatment and an individual refuses to consent to a test, examination or treatment or refuses any further care and is determined to leave against medical advice, after being informed of the risks and benefits and the hospital’s obligations under EMTALA, reasonable attempts shall be made to obtain a written refusal to consent to examination or treatment using the form provided for that purpose or document the individuals refusal to sign the Partial Refusal of Care or the Against Medical Advice Form (see Informed Refusal for Partial Refusal of Care and AMA form - English or Informed Refusal for Partial Refusal of Care and AMA form - Combined English and Spanish). The medical record must contain a description of the screening and the examination, treatment, or both if applicable, that was refused by or on behalf of the individual. 7. Stabilizing Treatment Within Hospital Capability. The determination of whether an individual is stable is not based on the clinical outcome of the individual’s medical condition. An individual has been provided sufficient stabilizing treatment when the physician treating the individual in the DED (dedicated emergency department) has determined, within reasonable clinical confidence, that no material deterioration of the condition is likely, within reasonable medical probability, to result from or occur during the transfer of the individual from a facility, or with respect to an EMC of a woman in labor, that the woman has delivered the child and placenta; ...8. When EMTALA obligations End - The hospital’s EMTALA obligation ends when a physician or QMP has made a decision: a. That no EMC exists (even though the underlying medical condition may persist): b. That an EMC exists and the individual is appropriately transferred to another facility; or c. Than an EMC exists and the individual is admitted to the hospital for treatment to relieve or eliminate the EMC; or d. That an EMC exists and the individual has been provided treatment which relieves or eliminates the EMC and discharged.”

    Rule A2409. Standard-level. From a complaint.

All 3 inspections in the last three years
Inspections on record
DateVisitWhat the record says
Jan 6, 2026Complaint inspectionNo deficiencies cited
May 21, 2025Complaint inspection2 deficiencies cited
Feb 23, 2024Complaint inspection2 deficiencies cited

How do patients fare?

  • CMS’s overall for it is 3 of 5.
  • Of the measures behind its , CMS counts against the national value: mortality, 1 better and 0 worse of 8; safety of care, 1 better and 0 worse of 7; readmission, 0 better and 4 worse of 9.
  • Patients rate it 3 of 5 in CMS’s patient survey (727 surveys completed, Oct 1, 2024 to Sep 30, 2025): 66% rated it 9 or 10 out of 10, and 65% would definitely recommend it.
  • Infections, compared by CMS with the national benchmark (Oct 1, 2024 to Sep 30, 2025): central line bloodstream infections (CLABSI), no different than national benchmark; catheter urinary tract infections (CAUTI), better than the national benchmark; surgical site infections after colon surgery, no different than national benchmark; MRSA bloodstream infections, no different than national benchmark; C. diff infections, better than the national benchmark.
  • CMS’s patient safety composite for serious complications, PSI 90, Jul 1, 2022 to Jun 30, 2024: no different than the national value.
  • Deaths within 30 days, as CMS gives them (Jul 1, 2022 to Jun 30, 2025): heart attack 11%, heart failure 9.5%, pneumonia 19.7%, COPD 10.5%, stroke 13%, heart bypass surgery 1.6%. CMS gives no comparison with the national rate for them in this release.
  • Readmissions within 30 days, as CMS gives them (Jul 1, 2023 to Jun 30, 2025): heart attack 16.3%, heart failure 22.8%, pneumonia 18.7%, COPD 19.5%, heart bypass surgery 8.8%, hip or knee replacement 5.9%. CMS gives no comparison with the national rate for them in this release.
  • After outpatient care, compared by CMS: unplanned hospital visits after a colonoscopy, no different than the national rate; unplanned hospital visits after outpatient surgery, no different than expected.
  • Emergency department patients spent a median of 139 minutes there before leaving (Oct 1, 2024 to Sep 30, 2025), and 1% left before being seen.
  • 79% of patients with severe sepsis or septic shock got the care CMS measures, SEP-1 (Oct 1, 2024 to Sep 30, 2025).
  • Medicare’s spending per patient here is 1.06 times the national median (Jan 1, 2024 to Dec 31, 2024).
Ratings and measures, as published
MeasureRating
Overall ratingCMS’s overall hospital quality star rating, 1 to 53 of 5
Patient survey ratingCMS star rating from its survey of the hospital’s patients (HCAHPS), 1 to 53 of 5

Is it certified, and in good standing?

  • Medicare-certified acute care hospital since Jul 22, 1974.
  • Ownership: proprietary.
  • It is accredited by The Joint Commission, whose surveys stand in for the state’s routine inspections.
  • Cited at in the last three years: it didn’t meet a whole condition of Medicare’s rules for hospitals.
  • It has an inpatient rehabilitation unit of 30 beds, which CMS lists apart as a rehabilitation facility.
  • Proprietary.
Source:

CMS, Provider of Services File - Hospital & Non-Hospital Facilities. Released Oct 14, 2026. Updated quarterly.

CMS, Hospital General Information. Released Aug 13, 2026. Updated quarterly.

CMS, QCOR Hospital 2567 statements of deficiencies. Released Oct 20, 2026. Updated monthly.

Has it been penalized?

  • CMS doesn’t publish fines or other penalties for hospitals.
  • Not among the hospitals whose Medicare payments CMS cut under the Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program for fiscal year 2026.
  • 4 deficiencies cited in the last three years came from inspections that included a complaint investigation.
Source:

CMS, Hospital-Acquired Condition (HAC) Reduction Program. Released Aug 13, 2026. Updated yearly.

CMS, Provider of Services File - Hospital & Non-Hospital Facilities. Released Oct 14, 2026. Updated quarterly.

CMS, QCOR Hospital 2567 statements of deficiencies. Released Oct 20, 2026. Updated monthly.

What do patients say about their care?

  • CMS doesn’t publish staffing levels for hospitals.
  • In CMS’s patient survey, patients rate how well its nurses communicated 3 of 5.
  • 35% of its health care workers got a flu shot (Oct 1, 2024 to Mar 31, 2025).
Source:

CMS, Patient survey (HCAHPS) - Hospital and Timely and Effective Care - Hospital. Released Aug 13, 2026. Updated quarterly.

Who owns it?

  • Galen Holdco LLC owns 100% directly since May 10, 2016.
  • 34 owners or officers are people: Michael Mcalevey (corporate officer); Jaime L Derensis (corporate officer); John M Franck (corporate officer); John M Franck (corporate director); Douglas L Downey (corporate officer); Eric D Smith (other role (CMS gives no detail)); Matthew King (managing employee (on the payroll)); Christopher F Wyatt (corporate officer); Christopher F Wyatt (corporate director); John I Starling (corporate officer); Shirley E Scharf-Cheatham (corporate officer); Richard Hammett (corporate officer); Joseph A Sowell (corporate officer); John M Hackett (corporate officer); Brian T Cook (corporate officer); Samuel N Hazen (corporate officer); Samuel N Hazen (corporate director); Nicholas L Paul (corporate officer); Ronald Lee Grubbs (corporate officer); Monica Cintado (corporate officer); Gary S Whitmore (corporate officer); Jon Foster (corporate officer); Seth A Killingbeck (corporate officer); Ricardo Pavon (corporate officer); Timothy Scott Noonan (corporate officer); Natalie H Cline (corporate officer); Michael T Bray (corporate officer); Peter J Rossell (corporate officer); Zachary Andrew Bowen Mccluskey (corporate officer); Zachary Andrew Bowen Mccluskey (managing employee (on the payroll)); Brad Ej Spicer (corporate officer); Kevin A Ball (corporate officer); Jeffery Mcinturff (corporate officer); Deborah H Mullin (corporate officer).
  • CMS’s Provider of Services file records 1 change of ownership, the latest on Jun 27, 1994.
  • No private-equity firm among the owners CMS lists.
  • No real-estate investment trust among the owners CMS lists.
Source:

CMS, Hospital All Owners and Hospital Enrollments. Released Sep 29, 2026. Updated monthly.

CMS, Provider of Services File - Hospital & Non-Hospital Facilities. Released Oct 14, 2026. Updated quarterly.

Organisations CMS lists
OrganisationRoleShareSince
HCA Inc.Owns 5% or more through other companies100%May 10, 2016
HCA Healthcare Inc.Owns 5% or more through other companies100%May 10, 2016
Healthtrust Inc. - the Hospital CompanyOwns 5% or more through other companies100%May 10, 2016
Galen Holdco LLCOwns 5% or more directly100%May 10, 2016
Hercules Holding IIOwns 5% or more through other companies22%Sep 23, 2016
Frisco Holding IIOwns 5% or more through other companies11.66%May 10, 2016

How does it compare nearby?

  • Of the 4 hospitals CMS lists in Okaloosa County, 3 have an overall star rating from CMS: 1 rated 5 of 5, 2 rated 3 of 5.
  • CMS rates this one 3 of 5.
Source:

CMS, Hospital General Information. Released Aug 13, 2026. Updated quarterly.

What the record doesn’t say

  • CMS doesn’t publish fines or other penalties for hospitals, so none are shown. The one payment cut CMS publishes for each hospital, under its Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program, is shown where it applies.
  • Only complaints that led to a citation appear; complaints that didn’t aren’t published.
  • Most hospitals are accredited by a private organisation (The Joint Commission, DNV and others) whose routine inspections stand in for the state’s; those reports aren’t public, and QCOR holds only the state’s surveys: no inspection on record here doesn’t mean none took place.
  • QCOR says its hospital inspection data are complete only through September 17, 2026, while it moves to a new system.
  • CMS doesn’t publish staffing levels for hospitals.
  • In its September 2026 release CMS gives no comparison with the national rate for death and readmission rates, though it gives the rates.

Sources

If you believe something here is wrong, a correction starts with the agency whose record this copies: CMS. CMS’s own record is on Care Compare. If Hearth Record copied something wrongly, it will fix it and log the correction publicly, with its date: how corrections work.

Source:

This copy of the record was made on Nov 5, 2026.

From the hospital

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Replies

None. Replies aren’t open yet. When they open, the hospital will be able to answer any finding for free, and the reply will show beside that finding, unedited and dated.

Paid listing

None. Paid listings aren’t open yet. When they open, anything paid for will say “Paid by the hospital”, and paying will never change a finding, a rating or the order of results.

How to read a record

Four things every record does, shown on an example record made up for this guide.

An example record, made up for this guide

An example nursing home

Made up for this guide: no real place is shown

Not fully inspected in over two years (CMS flag)

11 health citations at the latest inspection cycle

The state average is 14.3.

Source:

CMS, State and US Averages and Health Deficiencies. Released Oct 28, 2026. Updated monthly.

From the homeNone yet. Replies and paid listings aren’t open, and when they open they will sit here, below the record.

1 of 4

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